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Blooming Flowers, Fish in Water, Amphibians, and Apes:  
Herder’s Environmental Aesthetics of Nature
With regard to Johann Gottfried Herder’s Treatise on the Origin of Language 
and his Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of Mankind recent studies have 
stressed his crucial role in the pre-history of ecological thought emerging in 
German Romanticism and Idealism around 1800. In his Ideas Herder sought 
to explain the diversification of cultures as part of the history of nature by 
means of his theory of climate which allowed to correlate the abundance of 
organic forms to the variety of cultures since both are developing in accord-
ance with particular environments (cf. Axer). Moreover, he also developed 
a “proto-ecocritical perspective” (Rigby, “Nature” 33) in his previous Treatise 
on the Origin of Language: As Kate Rigby points out, “Herder traces the origins 
of language to an act of non-appropriative attentive listening to the animal 
other, perceived, moreover, as an alter ego, a ‘thou’”, and, thus, gives a “dia-
logical account of the origins of language” which “implies a mode of ethical 
comportment proper to the ongoing process of becoming human that is of 
profound ecological, biosemiotic and religious significance: it is ‘an appeal 
to let the world breathe and resound, and to dialogue with it’” (37). Against 
that background, I will focus on one of Herder’s very latest works, namely 
on Kalligone, published in 1800, that has been left unattended in this context 
so far. However, this treatise on aesthetics is of utmost importance to the 
pre-history of ecological thought since it introduces remarkable aspects of 
that “proto-ecocritical perspective” into the contemporary discourse of philo-
sophical aesthetics, more precisely, into the discussion on natural beauty as 
it was brought up anew by Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment from 1790. 
Herder’s Kalligone (meaning “The Birth of Beauty”) is a three-volume 
polemic, a kind of response quite harshly criticizing the Critique of Judgment 
in form of a loose dialogue, quoting and commenting on Kant’s central 
arguments in order to reject them, prove them wrong and outline another 
aesthetic theory in the course of that backtalk. Even though to both, Kant 
and Herder, natural beauty is of paradigmatic significance to explain what 
beauty is and how aesthetic judging works, their arguments and outcomes, 
however, differ radically. Objecting to Kant’s transcendental approach, Herd-
er accounts for aesthetic experience both ontologically and theologically, 
Animal St Bd 3 Print.indd   175 09.12.18   16:20
176 Jessica Güsken
engaging a neo-Spinozan view of nature. In doing so, he drafts a theory of 
natural beauty (and ugliness) that may be considered as environmental. He 
determines the beauty of natural beings in respect to their environment, 
i.e., the particular “element” (air, water, earth) they live in, and develops an 
aesthetic semiotics of (perfect) form, of environmental “wellbeing,” which 
not only accounts for the agential properties of matter itself and, thus, for 
an autopoietic process of becoming form, but also for a kind of empathizing 
human comprehension of this “natural alphabet”1 (122) of “living figures” 
(52): Considering natural beauties as “embodiments of properties and perfec-
tions of their particular element” (83), Herder argues that they are “signed 
with the living concept of their element” (79), and defines natural beauty 
as “the living expression of a creature’s wellbeing, each in its element, if the 
human being’s senses feel that expression harmonious to themselves” (140).
Antecedent: Kant’s Flower or What is a Free Beauty?
In his Critique of Judgment Kant precisely distinguished the aesthetic judgment 
from the cognitive as well as from the judgment on the good and, therefore, 
objected the prevalent aesthetics of perfection with its claim of a unity of 
the true, good and beautiful. He famously argued that the beautiful is liked 
“devoid of all interest” in or desire for the object (53; § 5), that it is judged 
“without a concept” of the object but nonetheless “liked universally” (64; 
§ 9), and that it is “an object’s form of purposiveness” which is, though, 
being “perceived … without the presentation of a purpose” (84; § 17). This 
implies that a judgment of taste is both independent of any sensual charms 
and emotions as well as of any concept determining the object’s purpose and 
perfection. Kant’s contemporarily somewhat provocative thesis is that beau-
ty—in its proper or “pure” sense—has nothing to do with knowledge, least of 
all with the concept of perfection: Calling something beautiful tells precisely 
nothing about this thing itself but only about the aesthetic pleasure of the 
judging subject (which is, though, claimed to be universally shareable with 
other subjects). However, Kant differentiates “two kinds of beauty,” namely, 
“free beauty (pulchritudo vaga)” and “merely accessory [anhängende] beauty 
(pulchritudo adhaerens)” (76; § 16).2 The judgment on the latter is not purely 
aesthetical but regulated by notions of perfection since it “presuppose[s] a 
1 Here and in the following, all translations of Herder’s Kalligone from theGerman are my 
own. 
2 Cf. the German original, Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft 146-49 (§ 16, B 49-53). 
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concept of what the object is meant to be …, as well as the object’s perfec-
tion in terms of that concept” (76; § 16). For instance, Kant explicates, the 
judgment on “the beauty of a human being … or of a building (such as a 
church, palace, armory or summer-house)” depends on the knowledge of or 
respect for the object’s purpose, hence, sticks to “a concept of its perfection, 
and so it is merely adherent beauty” (77; § 16). In contrast, a vague or “free 
beauty” can be judged purely by taste: It “does not presuppose a concept of 
what the object is meant to be” but is the “self-subsistent beauty of this or 
that thing” (76; § 16). To begin with, Kant presents “natural beauties”—first 
of all “flowers”—as exemplary objects of a “pure” judgment of taste: He 
explains that “hardly anyone apart from the botanist knows what sort of 
thing a flower is meant to be; and even he, while recognizing it as the repro-
ductive organ of a plant, pays no attention to this natural purpose when he 
judges the flower by taste” (76; § 16). Indeed, everything about the flower 
seems as if organized in respect to a purpose; yet despite this directionality 
to a goal, the end—i.e. the flower’s “natural purpose” and the perfection of 
its organism in terms of that—is not at all taken into account when finding 
the flower beautiful. Rather, one has precisely to desist from any concept 
determining “what sort of thing a flower is meant to be” because this “would 
only restrict” the “free play” of the mental powers understanding and imagi-
nation—which is, according to Kant, constitutive of aesthetic pleasure resp. 
“liking” [Wohlgefallen] in its proper sense—and, hence, would “impair” or even 
derogate [Kant says “Abbruch tun”3] “the purity” of the aesthetic judgment 
(77; § 16). To put it short, only an aesthetical view on the flower, that is, a 
point of view of non-knowledge enables this “free play”: Kant argues that 
“our imagination is playing, as it were, while it contemplates the shape” 
of the flower, its “mere form” (77; § 16). This, hence, provokes the special 
pleasure in the beautiful, its concept-less and “disinterested” liking, i.e., the 
subject’s contemplative enjoyment of a pure as if, literally cut loose from 
any code, free from any determining concept and ruling model of perfection 
that would otherwise regulate and, hence, “impurify” the judgment. So the 
flower is such beautiful only because it has no semantics but opens up a free 
play to productive imagination. Likewise, Kant adds, “(m)any birds and a 
lot of crustaceans in the sea,” and, similarly, also “designs à la grecque, the 
foliage on borders or on wallpapers, etc., mean nothing on their own: they 
represent nothing”, as well as “music without a topic, indeed all music not 
set to words [ohne Text]” (76-77; § 16).
3 Cf. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft 147, (§ 16, B 50-51). 
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Herder’s Objection: Human Pleasure in the Blooming Flower 
In Kalligone Herder accuses this account of aesthetic pleasure and pure beauty 
to be downright “contrary to the experience of everyone” (105). Rejecting 
Kant’s distinction of “free beauty” and “merely accessory beauty,” he denies 
that there even can be something like a sensation of “free beauty,” which is 
why he regards an aesthetic judgment operating without concepts as basically 
an untenable illusion, as just “speaking in a dream” (103). He claims that 
Kant’s definitions rather “fail to meet the nature of beauty and lead astray 
in broad ways” (39) since he set the basis of aesthetic pleasure in a merely 
“transcendent, super-sensuous substrate of mankind” (30), and turned the 
realm of beauty into “an illusory world without concept and purpose” where 
one merely “feels a quasi-nothing in everything pleasant” (52). Against this, 
Herder counters that “what is to be felt must be something, i.e., a substantiality 
[Bestandheit], an essence [Wesen] expressing itself to us; hence something true 
lies at the ground of everything that is pleasant or unpleasant to us” (52). 
Therefore, he not only stresses the concrete role of the senses, and, thus, of 
the body in aesthetic experience but also asserts an ontological significance 
of pleasure and displeasure. Essentially interlinked with that, he moreover 
asserts a semiotics of (perfect) form in nature as well as in art and artificial 
(re-)creation, hence insisting that “without concepts and the notion of a 
purpose the words beautiful and beauty are never in place” (88). Contradicting 
Kant, Herder seeks to demonstrate that this circumstance does not only be-
come apparent when considering a building or, the more so, a human being 
but initially precisely in respect to natural beauties other than human—which, 
hence, Kalligone’s first part deals with primarily. 
Herder starts his backtalk with the argument that aesthetic pleasure is 
not a “cold liking” (36), thus, in no way “disinterested” but rather of most 
fundamental interest since it is intimately connected with the interest we take 
in life itself, in our being and well-being, and, moreover, in the existential 
state and condition of other beings in relation to ourselves. Stating that 
“the inmost-pleasant is my living felt existence itself,” he argues: “the pleas-
ant does not merely gratify; rather, the inmost-pleasant expands, empowers, 
strengthens my being” (30). Nota bene, Herder derives the meaning of 
“pleasant” from “angenehm,” agreeable, stating that “pleasant is what each 
or any of our senses gladly agrees to [annimmt], what is acceptable [genehm], 
i.e., appropriate [angemessen] to it, what it approves [genehmigt] when perceiving” 
(27). He explicates that every affection by an object implements a process of 
internalization in which the perceiving subject appropriates what is agreeable 
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to it, and repels what is adverse: “What, according to how I am organized, 
is frightening, offending or hostile to the feeling of my being, is unpleasant; 
in contrast, what preserves, promotes, expands my being, in short, whatever 
is harmonious with it, that is gladly accepted and appropriated by each of 
my senses, finding it pleasant” (30). So pleasant is what gives me a feeling 
of liberation and strength, of not merely being alive but of living freely, 
strongly and joyfully, that is, as Herder terms it, a feeling of “wellbeing [Wohl-
sein]” (31). Moreover, he actually grasps “wellbeing” as the goal of life itself, 
and, hence, as universally pleasant to all living beings: “Wellbeing, welfare, 
health” are “the foundation of and purpose to the existence of every living 
being…. We all desire wellbeing, and whatever promotes this wellbeing in 
any way is pleasant” (31). Based on this, Herder with the term “wellbeing” 
not only addresses the pleasant feeling of living healthy, strongly and joy-
fully but, likewise, a being’s bodily perfection in adaption to its particular 
environment or “element” that conditions its maximum potential of being. 
He argues that the pleasure we take in the beautiful of nature precisely ap-
plies to our sensed or felt recognition of a creature’s “wellbeing” in terms of 
its perfect form and motion which emerges in an environmental dynamics. 
Therefore, this determination of beauty as a felt yet objective perfection 
cannot be diagnosed as a mere throwback to the aesthetics of perfection 
rejected by Kant. To Herder the sensation of a “living figure’s” beauty offers 
a recognition of the essence and order of things, and that is, of nature as a 
harmonic, yet not static but developmental unity of dynamically interacting 
physical forces in which he recognizes the ultimately divine “One spirit of 
life” (117)—that also manifests in the “spirit” of each particular “element”. 
As it indicates here, in his theory of natural beauty Herder actually readopts 
the neo-Spinozan view of nature he had already engaged in some former 
writings, that is, “an understanding of mind and matter, God and Nature 
as indivisible, albeit distinct, manifestations of the one universal substance” 
which, however, “reconceives the divine as an active and mind-like ‘primal 
force’ that is manifest in all creation” (Rigby, “Earth’s Poesy” 54). Whereas 
Spinoza “understood God as an active but unchanging ‘substance,’” Herder 
in his renovation stresses the “dynamically agentic properties of matter it-
self” and, thus, “redefine[s] the divine substance as an active ‘force’ (Kraft), 
animating and directing from within a ‘system’ of biophysical or ‘organic’ 
forces. These interactive forces materialise the underlying unity of nature 
and account for its developmental character,” which Herder thinks of as an 
“autopoietic process” (Rigby, “Nature” 35).
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Hence, objecting Kant’s theory of aesthetic pleasure as a concept-less, non-
semiotic “free play” of mental powers when contemplating the mere shape of 
an object like the flower, Herder counters: “Not any line, not any shape and 
contour in nature is an arbitrary [willkürliches] play; on bodies it is … the real 
expression of their essence, their being, composed from solidity and from forces, 
in respect to rest and motion” (48). He states that “the realm of organiza-
tions is ruled by the elements”: “[T]hese command and give form, i.e., they 
limit the organizing spirit ruling in a particular element so that every build 
[Gebilde] has to be considered an embodiment of efficiencies [Wirksamkeiten] 
and perceptibilities [Fühlbarkeiten] that took place in this element according to 
place and time” (88). Suggesting that “one can think of the body as received 
in the wrangle of the elements, after they have singled peacefully and defined 
in curves,” he regards the body as the result of several inner and outer ef-
fective forces and counteractions coming from the discomposure of chaos 
to a harmonically balanced “whole which this body is meant to be” (47). 
He argues that “the being or substantiality [Bestandheit ]of a thing is based on its 
effective forces in harmony [im Eben- und Gleichmaß], thus, on its limitation. Motion 
and rest constitute a maximum to it, and for multiple limbs or regards several 
maxima, exponents of its substance [Bestand ]”—and “this configuration to a 
lasting whole” is “the self-substantiality [Selbstbestandheit ], i.e. the wellbeing 
of a thing” (52). Reasoning, moreover, that “for all living figures there is a 
maximum of their being, a point of their perfection,” he states that “the sen-
suous perception of this maximum in all means and forces striving to that 
effect is the feeling of a thing’s perfection, its beauty” (52). Hence, Herder 
first determines natural beauty as “the incarnate expression of a  bodily 
perfection, harmonic both in itself as to our feeling” (51). Based on this, he 
then drafts a semiotics of environmental “wellbeing,” arguing that “every 
living creature, according to its shape and figure, incorporates a maximum 
of its significance, and the appreciation of this, rationally or sensually, gives 
us the concept of its beauty, i.e., of wellbeing in its particular element” (85). 
Significantly, the first creature Herder brings on to exemplify his theory 
of natural beauty is, in fact, a flower too. Yet whereas Kant presented it as 
the most exemplary object of a pure judgment of taste in order to show 
that any knowledge of the flower in terms of its conceptual recognition as 
“the reproductive organ of a plant” sets an end to purely aesthetic pleasure, 
Herder seeks to demonstrate the opposite, turning the flower into a kind of 
counterexample against that argument. He finds the flower beautiful because 
of her blooming, in which he sees “the full appearance of her wellbeing” (77), the 
“embodiment [Inbegriff ]” of her essence. In doing so, Herder’s view on the 
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flower seems, indeed, somewhat botanically or horticulturally informed but, 
nonetheless, noticeably differs from that of Kant’s botanist. In contrast to 
the latter, Herder empathically embraces the “lovely” flower in her “delicate 
figure,” addressing her in an ode-like tone as a living counterpart, a “you” 
or alter ego, stressing her powers of reproducing in human terms of love and 
motherliness, thus, outlining a decisively different concept of the flower:
Welcome, dulcet flower! an image of beauty and too soon overblown loveliness 
to all nations. Unseen, your roots strike in the soil, seeking earthly nourishment; 
yet thyself, delicate living figure, springing up and gently curved, you breathe the 
air, suck the light, sprouting leaves and buds. The higher up, the more refined; 
until finally you show with gathered power what you are, what you are able to do. 
There is the crown of thy life, thy work, the blossom, bridal chamber of love, a site of 
breeding, custody and nourishment to the young plant. To her, the verdant mother 
sacrifices all her power; at the peak of these motherly drives she herself shows 
in full beauty, i.e. in virtue of all her powers, behind which she wilts and recedes 
by and by. Nature, then, preserves her tender birth inconsiderable, indeed, yet 
firmly enclosed and well-arranged. She has accomplished her function [Amt]. (77)
Concluding his exemplary account of aesthetic experience of the flower, 
Herder stresses his point: “If humans rejoice in the flower, it is because their 
organs accord with the form and impact of this lovely being…. The bloom 
of the flower is always beautiful, the full appearance of her wellbeing, of her powers 
representing her. The beauty of the flower is the maximum of her peculiar 
being and wellbeing; she is beautiful to us, if our feeling may harmonically 
appropriate [sich zueignen] that maximum and gladly does” (77-78). One does 
not need to be a botanist right away to have a concept of the flower—though, 
for Herder, such scientific knowledge would actually not hinder the pleas-
ant sensation of her beauty at all. However, his presentation of the flower 
is determined to show that it is rather about another kind of knowledge: 
Aesthetic experience offers a special access to the world since it renders a 
kind of translation of the material realm of bodies into something we can 
grasp and understand in concepts—yet in “sensuous concepts” (cf. 88). To 
Herder, in aesthetic experience of natural beauty a system or harmonic 
unity of dynamically interacting forces and powers (of divine provenance) 
manifests. Initially, this concerns the flower as a “living figure” and, moreo-
ver, also an understanding of nature as a harmonic whole in which all 
creatures, including humans, are embedded and related to each other as 
well as to their environment in virtue of their bodies and feelings. In the 
example Herder first stresses the flower’s environmental powers of “wellbe-
ing,” picturing an agential, actively rooting, sprouting, growing, blooming 
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and life-giving animated being developing and forming in dynamical relation 
to her environment—“striking in the soil,” “sucking light,” and “breathing 
air.” Altogether, he tells a climactic and self-contained miniature-narrative 
of the flower’s complete life or, if one may say so, of her ontogenesis as an 
earthly organism becoming perfect form in terms of an autopoietic process. 
According to this, so to speak, holistic concept of the flower, her blooming 
appears as the culmination of her “wellbeing,” thus, the perfection of the 
goal or purpose of her being, harmonically embedded in the encompass-
ing, ultimately divine context of life itself. Furthermore, Herder argues that 
through the medium of feeling—understood as the (originally tactile but 
also in vision and hearing engaged) sense for the recognition of concrete 
bodies—the human is able to grasp the flower’s “living figure” in a kind of 
empathizing way, enjoying her perfect “wellbeing” by means of that sensu-
ous “accord with the form and impact of this lovely being.” Hence, the 
experience of natural beauty is—to a certain extent—a matter of empathizing 
with a creature’s “wellbeing” in terms of its perfect form and motion. This 
sensed or felt recognition of its “essence,” indeed, implies a proto-biosemiotic 
dimension: To begin with, Herder argues that “the entire moved nature 
talks to harmonic beings” through “sound or tone,” grasped “as the voice of 
all moved bodies, out of their inside,” reasoning, hence, that “there can be 
no doubt about our co-recognition [Mitverstehen], our co-feeling [Mitempfin-
dung ] with the voice and the gestures of living fellow creatures” (63) since 
“(e)very co-feeling animal understands these” (64). Later on Herder expands 
this point by stating that all beings in virtue of their shape and build, figure 
and motion “talk out of their world, out of their elements” (81). Nonethe-
less, at the same time Herder also stresses the necessarily anthropocentric 
perspective of this understanding “listening” and, thus, also of the aesthetic 
semiotics of “wellbeing,” pointing out that “it is always him, the human, 
talking to them”: “In the name of all he holds that dialogue; setting himself, 
as far as he can, in every nature” (81). Therefore, in “our” aesthetic experi-
ence of other living beings and, thus, with our concepts of their beauty it is 
rather about feeling and recognizing ourselves in the non-human other(s). 
The better we manage to do so, the more beautiful we find them. In fact, 
Herder in his exemplary account of the flower makes some rhetoric, if not 
to say, poetic effort to spell out the human’s concept of her, empathically 
grasping the flower as a “you” in terms of an alter ego, describing the blos-
som as a “bridal chamber of love,” moreover enduing the “verdant mother” 
with further human passions and businesses. Finally, Herder himself points 
out the appropriative character of that concept when stating: The flower “is 
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beautiful to us, if our feeling may harmonically appropriate that maximum 
and gladly does”. Not by chance he already introduced the flower as “an 
image of beauty and too soon overblown loveliness to all nations”. This 
gets even clearer when he claims directly subsequent to the example: “Even 
the most common sense understands this language of nature [Natursprache] 
since it is the thing itself…. All nations on earth know this language and use 
its images” (78). To demonstrate his point, he continues: “To whom youth 
compares herself most favorite? In which life she sees her own fortune? What 
does the girdle of flowers mean to the virgin? The similar graces herself with 
the likes of her,” and, “likewise, the youngling feels himself in the aspiring 
tree” (78). Moreover, Herder claims that “all primitive people [Naturvölker] 
mourn their son’s death in that image” (78). As Herder already invoked 
prevalent human codes and images of female ages—from the bride to the 
mother—in the flower’s stages of development, he as well sees all ages of a 
man—from the young to the “very aged man”—in each of the tree’s figures, 
picturing that “mature man gives shade and inclines his fruit-branches by 
and by” (78). Therefore, the “significance of living figures” (74) from which 
Herder derives the concept of each particular natural beauty shows as basi-
cally related to and embedded in (and, thus, also regulated and formatted 
by) cultural codes and discourses, especially the ones of myth, literature, 
and all arts in general, as well as cultural techniques—which, in turn, are 
inspired by nature. 
This moreover shows when Herder, subsequent to the earthly figures 
of flower and tree, invites his readers to “descend to the watery realm of 
Neptune”, now investigating the beauty that “inhabits this element” (79). 
Once more, whereas Kant considered the “crustaceans in the sea” as concept-
less, non-semiotic “free beauties,” Herder, in contrast, sees them lined with 
letters overall—which he ultimately identifies as the “true nomenclature of the 
Creator on his creatures, imprinted to matter through true, selected lineaments, 
… the pledge of godly truth” (122): Herder does not only assert that “cor-
als and pearls,” and “armored forms” are “signed with the living concept 
of their regional substantiality [Bestandheit ]”, i.e., their “element” (79), but, 
moreover, presents the fish in the water as the best example of perfect form 
in this element. In doing so, Herder outlines the human’s concept of the fish 
by means of a cultural technique:
All beautiful figures of the sea seem to us freely and happily built … for living 
in their element. As living vessels, as swimmers they appear to us, where ship and 
skipper are one, floating through the waves…. The fish floats and rocks on its 
sea-wings, shoots down and drives up, and sweeps and pilots. An unattainable 
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model of living shipbuilding’s craft. Observing … his delicate structure at the 
inside, at the outside, on so many species, the glossy, artful flakes and colors: so 
he seems to us, what he really is, a living representation of the silver sea itself, that 
not just has reflected [abgespiegelt] but has embodied in him, and, if one may say so, 
has turned into a feeling of itself. (80)
Considering the fish in the water, Herder explicitly terms natural beauty 
for the first time as the “embodiment” [Inbegriff ]”of an animal’s natural 
environment—i.e., here: the sea, whose concept, apparently, can be grasped 
by humans only through recognition of the fish’s perfect shape and motion. 
In other words: The fish tells “us” the meaning of sea. And, in turn, the sea 
gains a kind of consciousness or self-feeling as it embodies itself in the fish. 
Thereby, Herder designs a kind of metonymical relation between animal and 
environment since the fish is part of the sea and at the same time its signifier. 
Nevertheless, since Herder primarily captures the fish as “a living vessel,” as 
“ship and skipper (in) one,” an “unattainable model of living shipbuilding’s 
craft,” it becomes clear that the human being gets his concepts of things in 
nature not only by means of an empathizing view or attentive “listening” to 
them but, in doing so, through his appropriative (re-)creation of them. Actu-
ally, Herder later on explicates that it is “the essential rule of our (human) 
nature to create configurations out of everything that we experience and feel, 
i.e., to think only by means of creation [Gestaltung]: What the human being 
“thinks out of [herausdenkt] the pickings of his senses and impressions [aus 
der Beute seiner Sinne und Eindrücke] are configurations. He always is, good or 
bad, an artist” (119). In terms of that, Herder’s aesthetics of nature may be 
considered as both a semiotics and a poetics of environmental “wellbeing,” 
of perfect form. 
As an artist—that he is due to his own “nature” or rather essential de-
termination as “nature’s most gifted work of art [Kunstprodukt]” (127)— a hu-
man being imitates nature artistically and technically. According to Herder, 
“beauty in art [Kunstschönheit] is a humanly modeled imprint of beauty in 
nature [Naturschönheit]” (140)—though not in a merely copying sense. Rather, 
this mimesis is an appliance of the “omnipotent rule of natural beauty [des Na-
turschönen] as a maximum limiting itself in between two extremes” (72), thus, 
of the dynamics of interacting forces which the human being acquires in the 
“teaching school [Lehrschule]” (54) of nature’s beautiful figures. And through 
“Gestaltung,” through (re)-creation, Herder states, “the human being creates 
himself, i.e., he recognizes and uses that rule” (118). Thus, the human being 
is determined by nature to be both his own creator and creature at once: 
“(O)nly through art he became what he is,” and “as a human, art is natural 
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to him” (140). However, the human can realize his determination as that 
being who creates himself through culture only in interrelation, exchange 
and intercommunion with nature: “He lives in nature, built harmonic to her, 
and has to live with her. Hence, the history of his culture in appreciation and 
exercise of the beautiful is both natural and artificial [Natur- und Kunstmäßig 
(sic)]” (140). As the human being in his arts and actions uses nature to his 
own purposes in the ongoing process of becoming human, Herder finally 
calls him on to do this right, and that means tastefully: Whereas “nobody 
can deny that nature gets depredated and mangled through tastelessness of 
humans,” they are rather assigned “to improve and embellish nature in virtue 
of reason and assiduity, i.e., to bring her to a harmony and perfection that 
she, left to herself, never would reach” (314). Thus, as Herder’s aesthetics 
of nature basically implies a dimension of educating taste in order to educate 
and cultivate the human individual as well as mankind to become what it 
“truly” is, this aesthetics, at the same time, also implies a bio-governmental 
cast. 
Herder actually considers the human being as determined by “Mother 
Nature” to be “the ruler of the world” (128). As the prideful “last-born of 
the Creation” (128), the human being is also granted an aesthetically prior, 
indeed, a paradigmatic or ideal position. Herder regards the human as the 
telos of all natural figures, hence at the top of the chain of beings. However, 
Herder drafts an aesthetically oriented, environmentally informed, develop-
mental, and rather organological interpretation of the scala naturae. Arguing 
that all creatures cohabit “one common world” which is “ruled by One spirit 
of life” and “disposed” for both the “enjoyment of life in a particular ele-
ment” and “for common wellbeing,” he assumes an “universal analogy,” “one 
common type [Gesamt-Typus]” (117) continuously connecting all living beings 
which, again, have to be understood as elementally conditioned variations 
of that type. Herder claims that this “common type” “ascended according 
to elements and regions”: from “the swimming creature” with its “horizon-
tal figure,” to the “bird, flying in its element, gaining a freer build”, finally 
coming up to the “erected figure” of the human (117). In a certain sense, 
the human being comprises that “universal analogy” of natural builds in 
his own figure, giving him a repertoire of forms to compare and find again 
in his fellow creatures. In fact, Herder claims the human being to be “the 
evaluator of the world, judge of its shapeliness and beauty” (88). Moreover, 
he treats the human being’s own figure precisely as the “measurement and 
model of organic beauty” to judge all elementally varying natural beauties, 
claiming that “in the human all of his forms are significant” (90). Therefore, 
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Herder orients his aesthetics of nature “only according to human concepts 
and feelings”: “We do not talk about feeling beings of another kind, and 
it is a double foolishness to dream oneself into such unknown worlds” 
(116). Hence, finding something beautiful means, basically, that this thing 
is completely “clear and comprehensible to us,” i.e., to humans (77). This 
fundamentally anthropocentric character of Herder’s aesthetical semiotics 
of elemental “wellbeing” is of particular relevance when he deals with ugli-
ness in nature.
Ugliness: Amphibians, Apes—and Kant
Whereas Herder judged blooming flower and fish in the water as beautiful 
because humans can enjoy and grasp these figures as harmonious perfect 
wholes, each being “signed with the living concept” of their sheer elements, 
he argues that ugly animals occur at the “changeovers [Übergänge] of two 
realms of nature” (79). While he admits that these animals are, too, “built 
for their elements like with a compass at hand” (whereby he implicitly 
invokes the phenomenon of magnetism, thus, stressing again the agential 
properties of matter itself as well as the human recognition of that in physical 
sciences), he asserts that they nonetheless “appear obnoxious to us”: “ugly 
and strange at first sight” (79). When having “a closer look at them and 
accustoming to their looks,” one could, indeed, notice that they are likewise 
“most gently and harmonically accorded to the twofold element” (79). Yet 
he asserts that they are, nevertheless, ambivalent and “disharmonious to 
our feeling” since “our eye can hardly reconcile with their figure” (80). 
That is because the eye, according to Herder, “sees in every unit the unity, 
a whole,” and “constituting a unity is the very business of the visual sense” 
in such a way that “a world of indestructibly-lightish harmony and order 
appears in front of us [vor uns tritt]” (58). While “the human sets himself, 
as far as he can, in every nature”, in regard to the elemental changeovers, 
he apparently cannot, thus, seems handicapped here: Herder explains that 
these animals do not appear to “us” as perfectly comprehensible representa-
tions of their “wellbeing” for they seem rather dubious “Doppelartige” from 
a human perspective—adverse mixtures, in which, for instance, “earth and 
sea are mixed up” (79). Therefore, Herder explicates, they arouse distaste. 
To demonstrate this, he brings on “the figure of the amphibian” as the best 
example of these ugly “Doppelartige,” counting on his reader’s agreement. In 
this figure, Herder insists, “builds [Gebilde] of two elements, the land- and the 
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sea-animal, quasi adverse, intertwine. Head and chest a creature of the earth 
yet dragging limbs of the sea” (80). Unlike the preceding examples, Herder 
does not try to evoke his reader’s empathy here, i.e., our “co-recognition” 
and “co-feeling” with the amphibian by a narration as in case of the flower. 
Instead, he implicitly invokes a well-known topos of an ugly image as ancient 
poetics has it, namely, the mixed up mermaidly figure by means of which 
Horace in his Ars Poetica normatively illustrated a mimetically improper and, 
thus, ridiculously null creation: 
What if a Painter, in his art to shine, 
A human head and horse’s neck should join; 
From various creatures put the limbs together,
Cover’d with plumes, from ev’ry bird a feather; 
And in a filthy tail the figure drop, 
A fish at bottom, a fair maid at top:
Viewing a picture of this strange condition,
Would you not laugh at such an exhibition? (1) 
So the Herderian-human view on nature is not “free” but, rather, a priori 
formatted and normed by a certain passed down poetics and in the end 
somewhat conservative rules and notions of wholeness, unity and perfection 
preferred to or regarded as higher than other aesthetic forms and structures. 
In turn, Herder thereby also naturalizes normative rules of poetics as well as 
prevalent cultural codes and semiotics (as already seen in the bridal flower 
and the manly tree). 
Concluding his statements on ugliness in nature, however, Herder realizes 
a further error of the human aesthetic judgment. Asserting that especially 
those animals who “are most similar to us” are ultimately “the ugliest,” he 
explicates that this “very resemblance is beguiling; it corrupts, or, as we 
have already noticed in regard to other border-neighbors [Grenznachbarn], 
fools our judgment,” although “it should not”: “As cohabitants of one earth 
we may put us in the place of every of our relatives”; but, nonetheless, “our 
judgment on the animals of the earth becomes the more biased, the closer 
they live” (84). To demonstrate this, he brings on “the ape and the sloth” as 
“the very ugliest animals,” explaining that “they do not appear to us as what 
they are, but rather as a brute, distorted shape of man. We hate and regret 
the big sad ape, that seria bestia of our new cynical philosophers; and nobody 
looks without shame and disgust at the libidinous, lush [üppigen] ape” (84). In 
doing so, however, Herder cannot forgo a further polemic remark directed 
at Kant. In fact, he makes an ape out of his former teacher here, moreover 
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presenting Kant’s sensation of “free beauty” as a silly ape’s game—while, at 
the same time, stating that aping is a bad, deficient and ugly form of mimesis 
in comparison to that of the human: “Silently, one speaks to oneself: how 
similar is the ape to some of mankind! Does not even the rudiment of that 
what makes the human a creature of art, the imitative instinct, lie in front of 
us in the ape? This aping play, without concept and purpose but purposive 
to all appearances, where does it become clearer to us than in the apes?” 
(84). Finally, it seems kind of ironic that Herder uses, of all things, the ape 
to revile Kant—for at the same time the ape functions here precisely as a 
figure of reflection by means of which Herder points out the “corruption” 
and deception caused by that “beguiling resemblance” to the human himself 
and, moreover, also by “additional notions [Nebenideen],” thus, by certain 
concepts that tend to “black-out” the aesthetic judgment (89). Yet—properly 
understood—that was all what Kant meant when speaking about “adherent 
beauty” with regard to which aesthetic judging is not “free” but regulated 
because it is sticking to or depending on concepts and codes of perfection 
which are essentially normative. Hence, when considering ugliness, Herder’s 
aesthetics of nature in the end inadvertently converges to the statements of 
his archenemy Kant on “adherent beauty.”
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